🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix potential local code execution via git config#76
🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix potential local code execution via git config#76tachyon-beep wants to merge 1 commit into
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Co-authored-by: tachyon-beep <544926+tachyon-beep@users.noreply.github.com>
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🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: Invoking
gitviasubprocessagainst potentially untrusted directories could lead to local code execution via malicious.git/configfiles (specifically through features likecore.fsmonitor).🎯 Impact: An attacker could execute arbitrary commands by placing a malicious
.git/configfile in a directory that thewardlinescanner operates on.🔧 Fix: Propagated the
_SAFE_GIT_CONFIG = ("-c", "core.fsmonitor=false")pattern (already used inattest.py) to all other modules making git subprocess calls (delta.pyandlegis.py).✅ Verification: Ran the test suite (
make test), formatted and linted the code. Added a journal entry to.jules/sentinel.mddocumenting this finding.PR created automatically by Jules for task 18415563806124433476 started by @tachyon-beep